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THE CRISIS OF SWITZERLAND ON THE
THRESHOLD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

H. Dwight Page

During the fifty years since the conclusion of World War II in 1945,
Europe has undergone more radical changes than during the three preceding
millennia. 1 The Treaty of Maastricht, prepared by the twelve members of the
European Community2 in December, 1991, legalizes a process of European
social, economic and political unification and homogenization contradicting the
evolution of European politics and societies since the fall of the Roman Empire.
The majority of the nation states of Western Europe have been generated by a
concerted struggle against amalgamation into large transnational empires. Notable
examples are France, formed by the dissolution of its bonds with the AngloAngevin Empire in 1453; Germany and Austria, growing out of the dissolution
of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806; and Switzerland, generated by the revolt of
the original Swiss cantons against the Hapsburg Holy Roman Empire in 1291.
The Maastricht project is not altogether novel. It is a recreation of the
ancient Roman experiment whereby not only all of Western Europe but also the
entire Mediterranean world were united under a single economic system and a
single government. We recall the episode in Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the
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Roman Empire symbolizing the apogee of Roman power in Europe: so great was
Rome's prestige and unity in the region that the Roman legions once abandoned
the Rhone frontier for several weeks in order to fight a war in another area of the
empire. The Romans were confident that the Germanic barbarians would be too
intimidated by the reputation of Rome to assault the unprotected border. Indeed,
the Romans were correct, and the Germanic tribes of the Rhone preferred to
attack one another rather than to attempt a futile attack upon Roman territory
(Gibbon XII, 146). Yet the Roman social miracle was accomplished in a sylvan
and agrarian Europe whose population was for the most part illiterate and eager
to accept any government which could improve its condition. It is more difficult
to reconcile the willingness of the highly advanced and prosperous nations of late
twentieth century Europe to exchange their sovereignties and economic
independence, achieved through such arduous struggles and in some cases
revolutions, for participation in the highly organized European Union governed
from Brussels and Strasbourg.

We shall understand more readily this

extraordinary transformation in European affairs when we appreciate the principal
motive for these recent events: a desire to sink Germany irrevocably within a
network of European alliances and mutual legal responsibilities, thereby excluding
the possibility of the repetition of a catastrophe such as the Second World War.
With the single exception of Switzerland, each of the states of Western
Europe, and recently some Central European countries, have decided to surrender
a portion of national sovereignty to the common European government of
Strasbourg. It is the opinion of the governments of the participants in the new
European Union that membership in this pan-European organization will protect
their interests and insure their security better than would the preservation of the
traditional system of partially binding international alliances.
Under such circumstances, how do we explain the splendid isolation of
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Switzerland? We shall understand the Swiss case with greater clarity when we
realize that the Swiss decision to refrain from membership in the European Union
is a microcosmic expression of a more general European popular dissatisfaction
with the terms of the Treaty of Maastricht. It is important to note that, of the
twelve current members of the European Union, only Denmark and Ireland
required their citizens to ratify the Maastricht agreement by national referenda.
Elsewhere, parliamentary ratification sufficed (Passell). It is true that France held
a national referendum on Maastricht in September, 1992.

However, this

referendum was not required by the French constitution, but rather was arranged
at the request of President Mitterand and his cabinet in order to prove the
acceptability of the treaty to the French.

Indeed, the French vote illustrates

exceedingly well the principle of general European dissatisfaction with
Maastricht: the memorable vote of 51 % for, 49 % against ratification of the treaty
underscores the widespread discontent with the new centralized government of
Strasbourg throughout Europe.
In fact, the Treaty of Maastricht is not a genuine reflection of the popular
European will and would seem to violate one of the cardinal principles of the
French Enlightenment at the foundation of contemporary European democracies:
government is a function of the consent of the governed. Few nations take this
political ideal as seriously as do the Swiss, ~d it is highly symbolic that a Swiss
philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, expressed this idea in his Social Contract.
Swiss citizens are citizens in the truest possible sense of the word. As Jacob
Burckhardt once described Switzerland, it is "a spot in the world where the
largest possible quota of the citizenry are citizens in a full sense" (Luchsinger,

Europa-Dilemma). 3
A cursory examination of the Swiss political process illuminates
dramatically the superiority of the Swiss citizen to his counterparts in other
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"democratic" states. Whereas in Britain and the United States, citizens influence
the political process principally through the election of their leaders and delegates
to parliamentary groups, in Switzerland the citizen not only elects his officials and
delegates but also votes regularly on a number of important laws.

The

distinguishing characteristic of the Swiss system is the requirement that the
majority of laws be ratified at four levels: by the two chambers of the Parliament
in Bern, by the general Swiss electorate and by the individual cantons
(Luchsinger, Europa-Dilemma). Whereas neighboring European countries such
as France and Germany have developed more centralized administrations, the
security and prosperity of Switzerland have clearly depended upon the adamant
rejection of this political option.

Whereas in other democratic states the

lawmaking process is concluded by the approval of a given law by the majority
of the parliament, in Switzerland the lawmaking process is only partially complete
at the parliamentary stage. The laws must be subjected to further approvals by
the people and the individual cantons. In this process a law may be transformed
through several compromises. Of essential importance is the real contribution of
the individual Swiss citizen to the final form of the law.

In Switzerland the

power of the central Parliament in Bern is tamed by its obligatory distribution
through a system of checks and balances (Luchsinger, Kunstwerk). This highly
federalized system involves as much as possible the sovereign cantons in the
national decision making process. A significant additional consequence is the
direct power of the· Swiss citizen in national decision making.
Several leaders of the European Union consider the Swiss political position
untenable and unfeasible within the framework of the laws governing the Union.
The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mark Eyskens, has noted that if
Switzerland were a member of the group and if each decision made by the
Council of Ministers had to be ratified by popular referenda according to the
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Swiss procedure, the Union's legislative process would be retarded and impaired
(Berhoosel, L 'Adhesion).

Jacques Delors has exhorted Swiss politicians and

jurists to appreciate the fact that the European Union is not an ordinary
international organiz.ation guaranteeing automatic rights to its members but rather
an ensemble of countries linked by a common objective, requiring political
sacrifices from each (Pellegrini, Delors).
While the Swiss appreciate the need for cooperation in order to realize the
economic benefits of the program of the Union, they are not willing to make all
the political concessions required by the government of Strasbourg. The major
obstacle to Swiss participation in the group is the difficulty of the adaptation of
traditional Swiss laws to the new pan-European laws. Two problems in particular
require the attention of diplomats in Bern and Strasbourg. Firstly, for several
decades the Swiss have defined autonomously their laws in the spheres of
agricultural, environmental, foreign, social and economic policy. In this respect
they differ considerably from their partners in the EFTA association, which have
been gradually adapting their laws to the Union's norms over the past several
years. Thus a Swiss proposal of membership in the organization would require
a more radical and pervasive change of current Swiss laws than those necessary
for the other EFfA applicants.

Secondly, were the legal requirements of

Maastricht to be assimilated into the Swiss constitution, the traditional popular
initiatives and referenda would be allowed and applicable only in those cases
where they would not conflict with general Union law (Froehlich 29).
Consequently, the freedom of the individual Swiss citizen and his right to
participate directly in the legislative process, revered hallmarks of Switzerland
since 1291, would be radically circumscribed.
This conflict between the Union's demands for sacrifices and cooperation
from its members and Switzerland's determination to preserve some of its
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political privileges is demonstrated by a series of recent debates between the two
groups. In October, 1991 at Brussels the European Community concluded an
agreement with the representatives of the EFrA countries, described as the most
complex international negotiations in which the Community had thus far been
involved.

The resolved issue concerned the jurisdiction of the Community's

Court of Luxembourg under the terms of the pending treaty on the European
Economic Space.

The governments of the EFrA countries felt that their

acceptance of decisions rendered by this court would be excessively humiliating,
especially since they were already relegated to a position of political satelli7-ation
by Strasbourg. The result of this particular negotiation was the creation of a
special court to handle affairs pertaining exclusively to the EFTA countries. The
hope was that this concession would ease the assimilation of the EFTA group into
the Community. On December 6th, 1992 the Swiss government submitted the
EES treaty to the national referendum for approval. The consequent rejection of
the treaty by the Swiss people nullified the judicial compromise and other
arrangements made under the treaty. Other EFrA partners--Sweden, Finland,
and Austria--have since made formal applicatio~ for complete membership in the
European Union. Switzerland, however, remains adamant in its refusal to request
membership.
The most recent Swiss efforts to negotiate with the group have proven
especially difficult and embarrassing.

On February 20th, 1994 a proposal to

protect the Alpine region from international vehicular transit traffic was included
in the national referendum. The Swiss government had recommended a <negative
vote on the issue, fearing interference with its efforts to negotiate a solution to
the transit problem with Strasbourg. The Swiss people, nonetheless, approved the
proposal, causing much consternation in Strasbourg and across Europe. In the
past the European Parliament had tended to regard the requests of the EFTA
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group as obtrusive, selfish and unreasonable.

In this instance, however, the

reaction from Strasbourg was unusually acrimonious. Several ministers of the
Union expressed outrage at what they considered to be Swiss irresponsibility and
declared the impossibility of further negotiations with the Helvetian Republic.
The European Commission was even planning to send a stem reprimand to Bern.
This decision was luckily thwarted by the disapproval of British Union
representatives (Verhoosel, Stupeur).

The· British government considers

unsuitable the condemnation of any democratic decision. The British response
was the only correct one, in terms of international diplomacy.

The outrage

expressed by other Union representatives concerning the Swiss dilemma has only
served to exacerbate relations between Switzerland and Strasbourg. This incident
· is especially deplorable in that it has occurred at a time when the European Union
is trying to instill confidence in the political integrity of its legislation among
unstable candidate states in Eastern Europe. Further evidence of Swiss
determination to preserve the autonomy of their political system is provided by
their negotiations concerning admission to the Council of Europe in 1963 and
membership in the U.N. in 1986. In the former case, even though the Council
of Europe is a purely advisory organization with no supranational legal authority,
Switzerland hesitated for many years before finally making the decision to join
the Council. In the latter case, when the decision to join the United Nations was
submitted to a national referendum, the result was an overwhelming rejection of
the proposal (Luchsinger, Kunstwerk). In the sphere of international diplomacy,
the cherished Swiss right of direct popular participation in legislation has a most
unfortunate consequence: the Swiss government has a highly unreliable reputation
in international circles because, regardless of how carefully treaties are negotiated
with Swiss diplomats, they can easily be nullified by the requirement of popular
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sanction (Lang). This situation is clearly one of the major obstacles hindering the
assimilation of Switrerland into the new Europe.
The present structure and legislative procedures of the European Union
require unwavering conformity and cooperation from the participant states. The
essence of the organization's political system is legal and judicial homogeneity,
with disputes resolved through constant reference to the treaty of Maastricht, the
fulcrum of the Union's hierarchy. The essence of the Swiss political system, on
the other hand, is its legal and judicial heterogeneity, with disputes resolved
through dialogue and compromise between the people and the various cantons and
the central Parliament in Bern. The European Commission perceives itself as the
guardian of the treaties upon which the Union is founded. Whenever a member
state violates any of the rules established by these treaties, the Commission
automatically directs an inquiry into the matter and apprises the concerned state
of the necessary measures to take in order to regularize the situation. Any failure
to comply with the Commission's requests is referred to the European Court of
Justice in Luxembourg (Froehlich 57).

Clearly, before Switrerland could be

assimilated into such a process, Swiss laws must be modified and harmonized
with general European law to avoid collisions between the two systems and to
prevent the subjection of the Swiss to unwarranted and embarrassing political
scrutiny and intrusions.
When we consider the explicit consequences of Switzerland's own
adhesion to the Union, the discrepancies between the Union's objectives and
traditional Swiss political philosophy become evident. Firstly, Switzerland must
accept the Union's agricultural policies in their entirety and must surrender any
autonomous agricultural policies. Secondly, Switrerland must join the group's
trade union and apply the group's common commercial policies in its dealings
with external states. Thus the traditional Swiss treaty-making power would be
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diminished. Thirdly, the Union's rules in the area of fiscal harmonization must
be accepted.

Fourthly, mechanisms allowing the preservation of specifically

Swiss situations, such as the domestic job market and real estate markets, would
be subjected to strict supervision by Strasbourg. Lastly, Switzerland must accept
the organization's political hegemony and the subsequent reduction of its own
political autonomy.
Under these circumstances, it is easy to understand why the Swiss people
rejected the treaty on the European Economic Space December 6th, 1992. There
are simply too many disparities between Switzerland and the European Union, too
many problems still to be resolved. The uneasiness of the Swiss population with
the terms of Maastricht is mirrored in the Swiss government. The profound
divisions among the legislators of Bern on the issue of European unification are
a reflection of the divergent views of the entire Swiss nation (Tschopp, Sirenes).
In general, three of the four major parties in Switzerland are opposed to the
formal application for membership in the European Union. The Radical Party
prefers a compromise like the European Economic Space; such a compromise is,
of course, no longer possible. The Christian Democratic Party fears the loss of
its traditional support from the people of the rural cantons, strongly opposed to
the Union, and so wavers in its views concerning the issue. The Swiss People's
Party is torn between the Europhilia of Adolph Ogi and the isolationism of the
nationalist Christoph Blocher, and rejected the European Economic Space even
before it was rejected by the people in December, 1992. Only the Socialists
explicitly favor adherence to Europe, but with important reservations, notably the
implementation of Eurocompatible measures to protect the Swiss economy from
erosion by the European milieu (Petignat).
Even within the Federal Council itself, only President Rene Felbert has
given his unqualified approval of a Swiss application for membership. Of the
Federal Councilors in Bern, Otto Stich is the least convinced of the value of
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Europe for Switzerland.

Adolf Ogi, an avowed Europhile, is nonetheless

intimidated by the Europhobia of his party dominated by Christoph Blocher.
Flavio Cotti supports the theoretical idea of a European confederation, but the
Europe he advocates does not actually exist. Finally, even the most vociferous
Europhile of the Council, Jean-Pascal Delamuraz, who frequently proclaims the
outrage of the Romands against the indifference of their German Swiss
compatriots on the European question, hesitates himself to give unqualified
approval to the current treaty of Maastricht. He has often stated in deliberations
with the representatives of Strasbourg that, while other EFfA states may be able
to accept any compromise offered by the Union, Switzerland cannot do so,
because of the legal supremacy of popular referenda within his country. He has
rebuked the tepid invitations of Strasbourg with the words, "On n'achete pas un
plat de lentilles contre des sacrifices de souverainte. II en va de la dignite de la
Suisse" (Pellegrini, L 'adhesion).*
Thus far we have stressed the political disadvantages of Swiss admission
to the European Union. The negative vote on the European Economic Space
treaty of December 6, 1992 indicates that a majority of Swiss citizens feels that
these disadvantages supersede the advantages to be derived from participation in
the new European confederation. In a country where the highest authority is the
decision of the people, their opinion must be respected. Strong justification for
their point of view is provided by the following two succinct analyses of the
problematics of Swiss union with Europe. Firstly, the Swiss parliamentarian
Christoph Blocher attributes the prosperity of Switzerland to its extremely
successful and durable historical record of neutrality and complete independence.

* "You don't sacrifice your sovereignty in exchange for a dish of lentils. The
dignity of Switzerland is at stake."
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He cautions the Swiss that, should they accept union with Europe, they would
lose a great deal; the loss of individual freedom, sovereignty, self-rule, the loss
of security, a decrease in salary and higher taxes, and increasing uncertainty in
the job market would all probably ensue (Blocher).

In his article, "Between

Involvement and Separation," the Zurich journalist Fred Luchsinger expresses the
case for Switzerland's reluctance to join Europe in the following terms:
We are in the early stage of the unification process and have
already drawn the conclusion, in a broad consensus, that the way
of the Brussels Community cannot be our own. Thereby we would
have to surrender too much political, democratic, federalistic
substance acquired over a long period of evolution; according to
nearly universal public opinion we would thereby sacrifice too
much sovereignty, independence, self-rule, we would have to
surrender to an external, highly bureaucratic administration too_
many privileges, which we are not even willing to give to our own
Parliament. Too many material investments in agriculture, cartels,
foreign trade are at risk for us to take a change on an entry into
the European Union.
As the preceding citation indicates, it is impossible to divorce the political
character of a state from its economic structure. In the following paragraphs we
shall illuminate the economic liabilities befalling Switzerland in the event of
admission to the European Union. In order to understand the Swiss economic
position vis-a-vis Europe which led to the negative vote of December 6, 1992, we
must bear in mind two separate sets of juxtaposed concepts: firstly, the idea of
a European political and economic union versus a European economic association;
secondly, the idea of a European monetary union versus the idea of a European
monetary system. The European Union rests upon the two cornerstones of panEuropean politico-economic unification and pan-European monetary unification.
The foundation of Swiss policy vis-a-vis Europe, on the contrary, is a purely
economic association with Europe and a flexible monetary relationship with the
other European currencies. The EFfA organization, in fact, owed its genesis to
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these two divergent points of view: it was created as a result of the failure in
1958 of an effort to form a vast free trade zone embracing seventeen European
countries. The EFTA group feared commercial discrimination from the more
powerful European states and preferred membership in a less centralized
organization (Froelich 16).
The new European economic system depends upon unquestioned
conformity and uniformity; the traditional Swiss economic system depends upon
international economic freedom and flexibility.

It is understandable that

Switzerland would resist any effort to change its current economic status quo.
Liberal and uninhibited Swiss economic policies have led to the creation of one
9f the most prosperous societies in Europe. With the exception of Germany,

there is no other European country whose wealth is as widely distributed as in
Switzerland.

Poverty is virtually unknown.

Indeed, until the end of the

nineteenth century Switzerland was second in the world only to the British Empire
in terms of wealth.
It is important to remember that the principal motive prompting most

countries to seek admission to the European Union was their economic inferiority: .
countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece hoped to profit from the
economic expertise and assistance of the motor states of the Union, France and
Germany.

We must ask ourselves how each of the present members of the

Community would have reacted to the idea of membership if they had themselves
enjoyed the economic prestige of Switzerland. These other countries had a great
deal to gain by joining the European Union.

Under the present terms of

Maastricht, Switzerland would only suffer economic losses by accepting union
with the group.

The acceptance of the economic policies of Brussels and

Strasbourg would downgrade rather than upgrade the Swiss stand~d of living.
Such mediocrity is unacceptable to the Swiss. As Kurt Schiltknecht, director of
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the Swiss BZ Trust, has expressed the dilemma, "Unser Problem ist: uns geht es
besser als Europa" (Strehle).* Dr. Schiltknecht, an expert on the Swiss economy
and professor at the University of Basel, advocates the preservation of
Switzerland as a small autonomous state with a model economy. His views are
frequently supported by Christoph Blocher and other anti-Europeans in the
Parliament in Bern, as well as by a number of international ~nancial
organizations. On the theoretical plane, Professor Schiltknecht feels that the chief
responsibility of a state is to increase the freedom and prosperity of its citizens.
In his opinion, the highly federalized government of Switzerland has performed
this duty admirably. The current government of the European Union, on the
other hand, has not yet created the necessary prerequisites for the promotion of
such social well being. Professor Schiltknecht considers the Union's system to
be excessively dominated by a centralized bureaucracy; he points out that the key
to the resolution of Europe's economic problems is deregulation.
While Europhiles make the case that Switzerland needs to join the
European Union because the Union's economic policies are more liberalized and
effective, Professor Schiltknecht, Blocher, and a number of distinguished
economists have presented much evidence proving that the contrary is true. Their
research indicates that the European Union's economy is more regulated and the
Union's level of commercial competition is less intensive than in Switzerland.
There has never been, for example, regulation of capital flow in Switzerland, and
consequently a high level of convertibility of currencies within the country
(Strehle). Dr. Schiltknecht points to yet another thermometer of Swiss economic
superiority: the uniquely high level of social, political, and financial stability and
security in Switzerland, proven by the large number of foreigners who prefer to
maintain their funds in Swiss bank accounts (Strehle).

* "Our problem is: we are doing better than Europe."
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Finally, Dr. Schiltknecht maintains that Switzerland would be able to
preserve a type of independent financial island in the midst of the European
Union . . Such a situation would be most appealing to many members of the
international banking community.

According to this scenario, Switzerland's

insular economy would be protected and fueled by its singular position as the
second most important recipient of European Union exports after the United
States. Under no circumstances would the Union dare to discriminate against
such an important customer. A great deal of scholarship, including the research
of Gilles Oudiz, Stanley Fischer, Christopher Saunders, Paul Einzig, and Jeffrey
Sachs, supports this latter point of view.
An additional serious economic disadvantage resulting from Swiss entry

into the present European Union would be the loss of the flexibility of an
independent monetary system.

From March, 1979 until January, 1994 the

European Monetary System was the hallmark of the European economies,
maintaining margins of fluctuation among the French franc, Swiss franc, German
mark, lira and Sterling, and assuring conditions permitting the free respiration
and growth of the various national economies (Fabra, Maastricht: l'anti-SME).
Most economists concur that the European Monetary System is the most
appropriate for the stimulation of ideal economic conditions in Europe.
Nonetheless, the negotiators of Maastricht have judged the EMS unacceptable and
have replaced it with a new system of harmonization of the national economies
within the framework of the European Union. European monetary operations are
to be regulated by a new European Central Bank, established in Frankfurt,
Germany. A prerequisite for membership in the Union is the willingness
to accept and to realize a series of economic and monetary convergence with the
strict and explicit standards established by Maastricht.

The world's most

renowned economists consider such international economic homogenization to be
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utopian. Indeed, several members of the European Union have already on several
occasions had cause to regret their decision to abandon the successful European
Monetary System in favor of the Maastricht experiment, most notably in
September, 1992, when the effort of pan-European economic harmonization
wreaked havoc throughout Europe and compelled the British and Italians to
withdraw temporarily from the European Monetary Union.
In defense of their position, the negotiators of Maastricht and the
economists of the European Union admit that there will be temporary instability
as the various member states strive to adapt to the new European economic
regulations and attempt to implement more austere budgetary policies in order to
diminish their respective public deficits. They claim, however, that these initial
trials and sacrifices will be more than compensated by the eventual realization of
the ideal objectives of the Union. Specifically, internal Union economic studies
project a slight recession--the loss of 0.5% growth annually through 1996--to be
followed by a stimulating reversal of growth of around 1 % (Willemin 15).
Unfortunately, contradicting the predictions of the economists of Brussels
and Strasbourg is a vast array of evidence presented by respected economists
around the globe. The experts of the International Monetary Fund have predicted
the loss of between 0.4 and 0.8 percent of annual growth within the Union
between 1993 and 1996 and estimate that the Union will not enjoy any economic
growth until well into the next century. In addition, the World Bank recently
published a rather pessimistic commentary on the economic future of Maastricht
(Bruggmann 5).
Especially alarming is the analysis of Professor Martin Feldstein, a leading
expert on European economics at Harvard University, who has long been
skeptical that currency union would serve Europe's overall economic interests.
While he agrees that a European central bank dominated by the German anti-
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inflation ethic would stabilire prices, Feldstein argues that this process would be
more than offset by the costs to the individual countries in giving up control over
their currencies.

Professor Feldstein asserts that a single European currency

would be an economic liability. He points out that the creation of a single market
for goods and services does not require a monetary union. It is possible to have
all the benefits of free trade without a common currency. Indeed, the shift to a
common currency could actually diminish trade within Europe. It is likely to
reduce economic well being by raising future unemployment and increasing the
cyclical volatility of activity within individual countries. It could also cause a
higher rate of inflation than the current monetary arrangements (Feldstein,

Europe's Monetary Union, 19).
Two other famous experts on European economics, Professor Jeffrey
Sachs of Harvard and Professor Xavier Sala-i-Martin of Yale, concur that the
provisions of the Maastricht treaty are creating only a quasi-federal economic
system in Europe but will not lead to the benefits enjoyed by the citizens of a
truly federal system such as the United States. They explain that, when income
falls in Texas, the federal government reacts by increasing payments to the
affected Texans and by collecting less in taxes from the region. They estimate
that every dollar of income lost in a regional economic downturn is offset by a
forty cent gift from Washington. Europe, they point out, has no equivalent for
the American Federal Reserve System: European countries can rely only on initial
subsidies from the government of the European Union to enable them to attain
Union economic standards; they cannot, however, count on durable, long term,
legally binding assistance in times of .distress from Brussels and Strasbourg
(Passell 5).
Swiss consternation and exasperation in dealing with Strasbourg is thus
only a specific expression of a general dismay concerning the economic policies
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of the European Union among well informed economists everywhere. In the
Swiss case, the explicit negative consequences of an adaptation to the economic
regulations of Maastricht would be the following. Firstly, the necessity of giving
up the Swiss franc as currency would inevitably lead to the assimilation of the
low Swiss interest rates to the traditionally higher European interest rate levels.
The president of the Swiss National Bank, Markus Lusser, has prophesied that the
loss of the Swiss franc and the subsequent sinking of the "interest rate island" of
Switzerland would be more damaging to Switzerland than similar currency losses
in neighboring countries (Becher). The assimilation to the European level of
interest rates would be very expensive for Switzerland.

The loss of the

traditionally low Swiss interest rates and the concomitant low capital costs would
severely impair the entire financial structure of the country. Explicitly, the real
costs of interest rates in Switzerland would double from two to four percent in the
wake of European unification, and recent experience has proven to the Swiss that
high interest rates are poison for stable economic growth.
The doubling of the real costs of interest rates would result in the
reduction of growth of capital intensive industries, and of capital intensive service
enterprises, such as leasing companies and the hotel industry.

Additional

consequences would be an intensive redistribution of capital assets, high public
economic costs, an additional yearly increase of eight billion francs in taxes, and
a rapid rise in the inflation rate. In view of these facts, we can easily understand
the remark of Professor Schiltknecht, "Die Aufgabe des Schweizerfrankens ware
die diimmste Entscheidung, welche die Schweiz in diesem Jahrhundert treffen
konnte" (Becher).*

The experts of the venerable Swiss Kreditanstalt have

* "The surrender of the Swiss franc would be the most stupid decision that
Switzerland could make in this century."
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verified this dismal economic forecast, corroborating the case for Swiss isolation
from Europe.
Although thus far we have stressed the disadvantages of increased Swiss
participation in the process of European unification, it is important--in order to
give a coherent and accurate image of the current crisis on this question--to
present the case in favor of Swiss membership in the European Union.

In

general, the principal advantage for Switzerland in adherence to the Union would
be a substantial increase in Swiss decision-making power in European affairs
(Froehlich 30). As long as Switzerland remains outside the Union and is not
represented in the European Commission and the European Council of Ministers,
it will be unable to influence decisions determining the evolution of European
politics, society, and environmental conditions. This dilemma is all the more
critical in that the external European factor will inevitably determine the future
of Switzerland.

There are therefore clear indicators in the spheres of both

domestic and foreign policy pointing Switzerland toward unity with Europe.
A major obstacle to further Swiss relations with Europe is the fear of the
loss of Swiss political independence and autonomy, the most salient characteristic
of Switzerland within the European political spectrum.

Nonetheless, several

Swiss political experts have concluded that the Swiss political system would not
be fundamentally changed by unification with Europe. They feel that it would be
possible, through meticulous negotiations, to make only slight alterations in the
Swiss political structure in order to make it compatible with the general European
system.

Seventy percent of the integration process would involve the

modification of sixty Swiss laws at the national level; cantonal law would scarcely
be affected by the process (Petignat, Pas de candidature). The opinion of this
group is certainly corroborated by Swiss political adroitness and expertise during
the EU/EFfA negotiations in October, 1991 in Luxembourg, resulting in a series
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of concessions by the Union to the EFfA group, strengthening Switzerland's
power vis-a-vis the Union. If these negotiations are an indicator of Switzerland's
future role in the European political process, then membership in the European
Union should enable Switzerland to exert considerable influence over the
development of the new pan-European laws. Generally, Switzerland's political
power and influence would be much enhanced by its direct participation in the
deliberations of the councils and commissions of Strasbourg.
Another practical reason motivating the Swiss to maintain relations with
Strasbourg is the desire to benefit from the numerous research opportunities with
the European Union. The Union funds and directs fifteen programs in scientific
and technological research. Although in the event of Union membership, the
· Swiss government would be required to pay one hundred million francs to the
Union research fund, Switzerland would receive a comparable sum from
Strasbourg to support its own research projects (Waldner 7).

An additional

advantage would be the opportunity for the Swiss to suggest and to direct
themselves projects funded by Strasbourg. Tim Goldimann, a researcher at the
Swiss Department of the Interior, is convinced that the profits Switzerland would
derive from the Union research projects would supersede any capital the country
would be required to invest therein.

The Federal Councilor Jean-Pascal

Delamuraz has also drawn attention during interviews with the media to the
discrimination to which Swiss researchers and students would be subjected should
Switzerland reject integration with Europe (Parma).

He does not feel that

Switzerland can afford the loss of the vital European research subsidies. He
reminds the Swiss that their rejection of membership in the United Nations in
1986 has already harmed Swiss interests, and he is certain that the rejection of
the European Union would have even more harmful consequences for the
country's future in Europe.
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Goldimann and Delamuraz are the majority of young people and students in
Switzerland.

Clearly, this latter group would most directly benefit from the

various research projects directed by Strasbourg.
Possibly the most cogent argument supporting Switzerland's membership
in the European Union is the guarantee of security which membership would
afford the country. In the past, Switzerland's security has been guaranteed by its
policy of neutrality.

However, this policy developed as a reaction to the

aggression and unpredictable behavior of the surrounding national states. Now
that political unification has been achieved in Western Europe, the Swiss no
longer need fear the imperialism of the French, Germans and Russians. Their
security is insured by the pan-European laws of Maastricht. In the absence of the
neutral balancing power which American military forces once exerted in Western
Europe, Switzerland's highest degree of security lies in unity with the other
members of the European Union. As Giuseppe Spadolini, President of the Italian
Senate, has noted,
The federal Europe (EU) constitutes the only antidote against all
the phenomena of fragmentation, dissolution which, from the
Balkans to Russia, without excluding the western countries with
their thousands of particularisms and regional egocentricities,
menace its very integrity (Rusconi).
In the economic sphere, we have already delineated the very strong case
for Swiss isolation. However, even in this area we should note for the sake of
scholarly accuracy the hypothetical positive effects upon Switzerland derived from
official membership in the European Union. Firstly, membership could guarantee
the attractiveness of Swiss industry and enterprises to foreign investors. Failure
to join the Union could lead to the weakening of competitiveness for the Swiss
business community in international markets. Another EFfA state, Sweden, was
actually beginning to experience such a desertion by its traditional foreign
investors, who were beginning to prefer investments in the European Union.
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This undesirable situation was the principal motive for Sweden's decision to
abandon its position of cautious entente with the U nion--similar to that of
Switzerland--and to seek boldly admission into the organiz.ation (Franklin).
Secondly, the creation of the European Union has relieved the bureaucratic
difficulties in the international transport of merchandise.

The piles of forms

which merchants once had to complete prior to international shipment have been
replaced by a single simple questionnaire. Union members can moreover import
duty free fifty percent more merchandise than previously.
Thirdly, the activities of the Union have facilitated the creation of a highly
unified trans-European market, which permits greater financial independence to
the individual entrepreneur. The most striking example is that of the European
national banks, which now have the right to establish branches within any country
belonging to the Union (Franklin).
Fourthly, evidence proves groundless the fear of high competition for
lucrative jobs in Switzerland resulting from Union membership. On the contrary,
experience within the European Union itself has demonstrated that, since the
removal of travel restrictions among member states in 1993, there has been no
noticeable increase in the migration of workers from the poorer countries such as
Italy, Greece and Spain, to the wealthier countries such as Britain, France and
Germany (Schittenhelm).
Fifthly, economic analysts of the Swiss government have concluded that
European unification would not impair certain sectors of the domestic economy:
the consequent liberalization of capital transfers, for example, would not cause
any problem, nor would the acceptance of Union law in the area of services such
as banks and insurance agencies (Froehlich 27).
Sixthly, participation in the European Union would not require any
extraordinary expenditures or financial sacrifices by the Swiss people. The Union
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budget is no longer nourished by national contributions, as was the case in the
initial phase of the organization in the seventies and eighties, when France,
Germany and Britain were required to inject into it enormous sums of capital.
At present, the revenue for the Union budget is derived from autonomous
resources, such as customs duties on imports from abroad (Tschopp, Europa).
Unlike Britain, France and Germany, Switzerland would not be compelled to
make unusual initial financial sacrifices.

Entering the Union at a relatively

mature stage of its development, Switzerland would derive immediate and
permanent benefits from membership.
Lastly, in recent years Strasbourg has substantially increased assistance to
the rural farming communities of Europe. Two-thirds .of current Union expenses
are in the area of agricultural policy and subsidies (Froehlich 9). Ironically, it
is European farmers who are most vociferous in their protests against
Strasbourg's policies. We recall the recent riots of French farmers in Paris. The
majority of European farmers are still unaware of the remarkable benefits that
Maastricht will bring to their lives and work. A case in point is that of the
Austrian farmers, who were violently opposed to Austria's membership in the
Union until their German colleagues pointed out to them the considerable
improvements on their own farms resulting from the high- Union subsidies.
Thereafter, the Austrian farmers showed more respect for the policies of
Strasbourg. While Switzerland still maintains the highest rate of agricultural
subsidizing in the world (75%), the European Union is making progress in
erasing the discrepancies between its own and Swiss agricultural policies.

Switzerland does continue officially to resist membership in the European
Union. The country does, however, maintain its dialogues with Strasbourg on the
European question.

For the past several decades Switzerland has also been
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involved in close commercial relationships with the European Union. In 1990,
for example, 58% of Swiss exports were designated for the Union, while 71.5%
of Swiss imports that year originated in the Union (Froehlich 11).

Swiss

enterprises are among the principal investors in the Union: their branches in the
Union employ more than 400,000 persons, while 600,000 citizens of the Union
work in Switzerland (Froehlich 12).
The process of entente between the Union and the EFfA states has
considerably accelerated since the Luxembourg Conference of April 9th, 1984.
The then signed Declaration of Luxembourg expressed the strong will to intensify
cooperation between the two groups, with the objective of creating a new unified
economic space in Europe (Froehlich 22). This spirit of cooperation has been
further enhanced by the increasing respect for and use of the principle of
subsidiarity by the European Union in its policy making: the delegation of more
power and authority to the various regional and national administrations. As the
European Union has grown to embrace additional members, there has been a
concomitant growth of its interior diversity and a strengthening of resistance by
member states against centralized uniformity (Luchsinger, Verjlechtung). This
tendency toward structural flexibility has been recently legalized by formal
provisions of the treaty of Maastricht. This legal reform has profoundly altered
relations between the Union and its EFI'A partners.

The new treaty will

definitely ease the transition of the EFI'A states into the Union in that the
document strengthens the federalistic characteristics of the organization and
guarantees the preservation of the national identity and sovereign rights of each
member state.
The treaty's articles include the following explicit legally binding contracts
with each member of the Union. Firstly, "The Union shall respect the national
identity of each of her member states." Secondly, the national autonomy of each
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social partner will be formally respected. Differentiation in national policies will
be expressly permitted in the realms of environmental, consumer, health and
social policy, and also in those cases where economically underdeveloped
countries such as Greece and Portugal would be overcharged by strict conformity
to the more advanced Union norms. Thirdly, "An advising committee composed
of representatives of regional and local corporations, hereafter to be known as the
Committee of the Regions, shall be established" (Thalmann).
These statements in the new text of Union law are especially reassuring
to the smaller European states.

They decidedly influenced the decisions of

Sweden and Austria to apply for Union membership this past year. They are
absolute prerequisites for further negotiations between the Union and Switzerland,
the only remaining independent EFTA state. Clearly the political orientation of
the European Union is toward a model of democracy and federalism more and
more compatible with the Swiss model.
Among Swiss politicians the Federal Councilors Adolf Ogi and Jean-Pascal .
Delamuraz have been especially involved in efforts to apprise their dubious
countrymen of this encouraging rapprochement between the Swiss political system
and the general European system.

Adolf Ogi has stated that the debate on

Maastricht and the initial implementation of the ·treaty have proven that national
idiosyncrasies and differences can be respected and preserved within the European
Union (Ogi). This democratic evolution of the group should allay the Europhobia
of the Swiss, as it did the fears of the Austrians and the Swedes. Mark Eyskens,
the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and a strong advocate of Swiss
membership in the Union, has presented the case to the Swiss thus:

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol31/iss3/3

24

Page: The Crisis of Switzerland On the Threshold of the European Union

27
L'Union Europeenne n'est pas un monstre qui vales avaler. L'UE
est tout de meme un systeme ou prime la subsidiarite, a savoir une
tres large autonomie des Etats membres" (Verhoosel,
L 'adhesion).*
Further reassuring the minority states applying for admission to the Union
should be the extremely democratic process of decision making, both within the
European Commission and within the European Council of Ministers. Once a
draft bill has been adopted by the Commission, it is passed to the Council, where
it becomes the subject of an intense dialogue representing the points of view of

all member states. Concern for the creation of an atmosphere of understanding
and good will encourages the Commission to amend each of its proposals in order
to harmonize the divergent points of view in the Council. The Commission thus
plays the role of a mediator in these debates. In such a system it is impossible
for laws gravely injuring the interests of minority states to be devised. In fact,
the Union has the legal obligation in this process to guarantee the rights of small
states (Froehlich 10).
Additional protection is afforded to countries such as Switzerland and
Sweden by the European Parliament in Strasbourg, which must approve the laws
and serves to check and to balance the authority of the central Brussels executive
group (Luchsinger, Ve,jlechtung).

In addition, numerous precedents-within

the present European Union have proven that the process of European political
and economic unification has not diluted the national and regional identities of the
current member states (Chenaux-Repond, Petignat).

* "The European Union is not a monster which is going to swallow them up.
The EU is after all a system in which prevails subsidiarity, in other words, a
very high degree of autonomy for the member States."
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The final argument in defense of the case for Swiss assimilation into
Europe is the traditional status of Switzerland as a microcosmic model of
European society. Numerous scholars and politicians have drawn attention to this
phenomenon. Giuseppe Spadolini has called Switzerland a model of political
liberties and religious tolerance, a little Europe, the microcosm of what the
European Union will become (Rusconi). Dieter Chenaux-Repond has pointed out
that Switzerland--an integration of four linguistic and ethnic groups--has been
experiencing the European Union at the national level for centuries, and that the
Swiss nation owes its success to the willingness of the cantons to yield a portion
of their autonomy to the higher Confederation for the sake of greater national
prosperity. He feels that this willingness to cooperate at the national level should
now be projected upon the international stage.

In his article, "The Swiss

European Dilemma," Fred Luchsinger has maintained that the essence of Swiss
history has been the dialectic between domestic independence and the
incorporation of the languages, ideas and customs of its European neighbors.
Finally, in his work, "Switzerland without Orientation," the theologian
Hans Kling expounds the theory that Switzerland should and could become a
European pioneer nation par excellence. He observes that the European Union
would like to achieve at the macrocosmic level what Switzerland has already
achieved at the microcosmic: a genuine multicultural community of different
peoples, languages, and customs. In this respect, Switzerland could serve as an
experienced mentor to the less experienced, more embryonic European Union.
Peter Ziegler has succinctly expressed this point of view:

"Europa hat der

Schweiz viel zu bieten. Aber auch die Schweiz hatte Europa viel zu geben. "*

In summary, much progress has been made toward the realization of
international cooperation and peace in Europe since the inception of the
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experiment in the years following the Second World War. Thousands of learned
political scientists and economists have contributed to the creation of the highest
degree of international harmony Europe has known since the - Age of the
Antonines in the second century. These scholars' theoretical models and ideals
have been crystallized in the Treaty of Maastricht, and for the most part this
document is sound and logical, designed by its authors to increase the happiness
of Europe. Seven of the eight major points of the treaty are valid and are already
enhancing the quality of European life: the right of European citizenship; the
right to attend university in any country of the European Union; the right to travel
freely between member countries; consumer protection by Union inspection of
products; more prudent regulations concerning environmental protection; the right
to work in any country of the Union as well as new professional training
programs; universal health insurance coverage for Union citizens, valid for
persons traveling to other member countries.
The eighth major point of Maastricht--the concept of European monetary
union with the ecu as the single European currency--is, however, extremely
problematic. This portion of the treaty is the result of poorly informed judgments
concerning the reality of the European economic milieu and requires considerable
re-evaluation and revision. Just as in the Biblical story of Samson, the pressure
which Samson exerted upon a single central pillar resulted in the collapse of the
temple of the Philistines, so will the stress generated by the attempt to replace the
natural monetary policies of the individual European countries with an artificial

* "Europe has a lot to offer to Switzerland.

But Switzerland also would be able

to give a lot to Europe."
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monetary union result in the collapse of the European Union. It is imperative that
the organmltion' s government reformulate its policies on this crucial issue. The
world's most eminent economists--Charles Cerami, Paul Einzig, Stanley Fischer,
Richard Marston, Christopher Saunders, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Gilles Oudiz,
Jeffrey Sachs and Martin Feldstein--all concur on the following points: European
monetary union is not necessary to promote trade within Europe and is more
likely to raise than to lower European inflation. Moreover, the loss of separate
national monetary policies resulting from the creation of a European Central Bank
would increase cyclical problems and thus raise the average unemployment rate.
The process of monetary centralization would ultimately require a parallel
centralization of tax and spending decisions that is neither necessary nor
desirable. Finally, the process of transition to monetary union would be long and
painful and, once there, the trade gains from a single currency would be
relatively small and more than offset by the adverse effects on inflation and
unemployment.
In addition, the European Commission's idea that free trade requires fixed
exchange rates is contrary to all standard economic analysis. Indeed, the benefits
of free trade are enhanced by exchange rates that adjust freely, as in the former
European Monetary System (Feldstein, Maastricht 16).

Further, theoretical

analysis finds many circumstances under which international economic
coordination worsens rather than improves the economic performance of
individual countries (Fischer 39). Jeffrey Sachs has summarized the situation
thus:

floating exchange rates provide diversification and can help stagger

business cycles across countries; while there may be some gains in coordination
in terms of reducing volatility of exchange rates, the cost is that all countries
must buy into a single set of beliefs, which are sure to be wrong some of the time
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(Marston 163).

In general, the economic costs of the proposed European

monetary union outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom.
As far as Switzerland is concerned, the current controversy concerning the
validity of the monetary aspects of Maastricht constitutes the strongest caveat
against a Swiss application for membership in the European Union. Switzerland
should not even consider unification with Europe until this critical monetary
problem has been resolved. After all, the aforementioned hypothetical advantages
of membership in the European Union would be nullified should the
organization's monetary foundation become too unstable.

Further, the most

optimistic economic analyses of Swiss assimilation into Europe have simply
indicated that the Swiss economy would not thereby be impaired; the most
negative economic analyses of such unification have stressed the consequent
doubling of interest rates and marked increase of inflation within Switzerland.
No serious study has discovered significant economic benefits for Switzerland
resulting from European union.
On the other hand, in defense of the case for Swiss economic
independence, it is essential to note three points:

the Swiss economy has

continued to flourish despite the negative Swiss vote on the European Economic
Space in December, 1992; Switzerland's position as the second most important
customer for the European Union's exports automatically protects the country
from international economic discrimination; Swiss watches and clocks and Swiss
textile machinery show the highest degree of specialization in the international
quality index of merchandise, thereby guaranteeing a perennial market for these
classic Swiss products (Saunders 26-27). In sum, the economic case for Swiss
assimilation into Europe is quite weak; Switzerland does not need Europe in order
to maximize its economic prosperity. The country is already at the apex of the
European hierarchy in this sphere.
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The political advantages of Swiss membership in the European Union are,
however, quite appealing. The Swiss government would thereby acquire a degree
of influence over European affairs far superior to that which it presently enjoys.
The considerable extent of this hypothetical influence is demonstrated by
numerous precedents in the realm of European diplomacy, notably Switzerland's
highly successful performance at the EFrA-EU negotiations in Luxembourg in
October, 1991.

Clearly, as an official member of the European Union,

Switzerland could fully implement its traditional skills in diplomacy and treatymaking and exert an unprecedented degree of influence over the pan-European
decision-making process. In no area is the prospect of such Swiss international
political power more exciting than in the sphere of European-African relations.
Proven Swiss expertise in humanitarian missions and negotiations with African
states could greatly facilitate the European Union's efforts to realize the
provisions of the Treaty of LOME IV and thereby to increase the foreign trade
of the affected African nations. Such endeavors are all the more essential in that
economic analysis has proven that the achievement of an optimal world economic
market depends upon the successful resolution of the debt problems of these
African countries; the problems can be resolved only by international economic
coordination in the form of mutual agreements among wealthier nations to
maintain open markets for the exports of the debtor countries (Feldstein, IEC, 9).
Despite the opportunities for such increased international influence, the
government of Switzerland should under no circumstances proceed with the
process of European unification until the crisis concerning the European Monetary
Union has been resolved. The acceptance of the current monetary policies and
objectives of Maastricht would result not only in the loss of the Swiss monetary
system but also the loss of all other major Swiss domestic policies on wages,
prices, fringe benefits, investments, and stock market operations (Cerami 66).
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The acceptance of the European Monetary Union would mean the virtual
extinction of Switzerland as a sovereign nation. This situation is of course not
a specifically Swiss dilemma; it is the most serious crisis facing all European
states in 1994.
The defects in the monetary concepts of the Treaty of Maastricht are a
consequence of a deplorable failure among the administrators of Brussels and
Strasbourg to respect the principle of deference: the process of European
monetary and economic union has now entered its second stage with the
establishment of the European Monetary Institute in Frankfurt, and yet neither the
European Commission nor the European Parliament have consulted the
aforementioned distinguished experts on international economic and monetary
coordination. Alexandre Lamfalussy, the President of the European Monetary
Institute and the holder of a doctorate from Oxford University, has himself often
noted the lack of communication between academia and banking, as well as the
consequent failure among bankers to apply valuable critical and analytical thought
to their daily transactions.

At present, for example, European bankers are

excessively concerned with the idea of price stability as the main objective of
monetary union; deference to and careful reflection upon the theories of the most
renowned professors of economics would help these bankers to understand that
price stability is not as important as the free operation of natural market forces
for the creation of optimal monetary policy and optimal international trade.
European currency union would unfortunately prevent these natural market forces
from changing long-term interest rates and market exchange rates when conditions
in Europe warrant such a change.

Europe will never be happy until the

government of Strasbourg learns to apply systematically the principle of deference
to the most learned academic experts in each respective sphere of its activities.
The voice of reason and scholarship is imperial. Hearing this irresistible voice,
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Strasbourg will encourage dialogues between professors of economics, such as
Dr. Martin Feldstein and Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, and the practitioners of European
banking and finance, such as Dr. Alexandre Lamfalussy.

Insofar as Swiss

recalcitrance on the issue of European unification has compelled the government
of the European Union to question and to reassess the validity of its structure and
objectives, and to seek wiser alternatives, Switzerland has made a significant
contribution to the future stability and prosperity of Europe.
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NOTES

1

I should like to thank Monsieur Victor Ruffy, former President of the Swiss

National Assembly, for allowing me access to the private library of his office in
Lausanne in July, 1992. This article would have been impossible without the
materials which I acquired during this visit. In addition, I wish to thank Mr.
John Bass, a graduate teaching assistant in the Department of History at the
University of Memphis, for his invaluable help in a computer search for several
articles and books used to prepare this work.
2

The European Community was renamed the European Union on November 1,

1993.
3

A number of newspaper and magazine articles used in conducting my research

were obtained from the documentary service of the Swiss Parliament in Bern.
This service collects and binds monthly excerpts from the press dealing with
common themes of national interest. Hence the lack of page numbers for some
references. Scholars desiring to consult the original press items should either
request the specific edition from the main office of the given newspaper, or write
to the following address in Bern and request a copy of the press document for the
given month in the series entitled, "Die Schweiz und die europaische Integration":
Services du Parlement
Centrale de documentation
3003 Bern, Switzerland
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